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THE CRAM DOWN AND VALUATION UNDER
CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
ISAAC M. PACHULSKIt
I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code' establishes a procedure under
which the rights of creditors or equity holders of a debtor may be read-
justed by way of a plan, even without the consent of all parties whose
rights are to be modified by the plan. The confirmation of a plan2 by
the court requires, however, that certain conditions be met. The con-
tents of the plan must comply with section 1123 of the Code,3 which
specifies the mandatory and permissible features of a plan. Certain dis-
closures must be made to creditors and equity holders before the plan is
submitted to them for their acceptance or rejection.4 Moreover, various
conditions to confirmation spelled out in section 1129(a)5 must be met.
t Member Stutman, Treister & Glatt Professional Corporation, Los Angeles, California;
Member of the California Bar. B.A. University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. Harvard Univer-
sity. Copyright © 1980 by Isaac M. Pachulski. All rights reserved.
1. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1174 (West 1979).
2. A plan that is confirmed by the court binds every creditor, equity security holder, and
general partner of the debtor, whether or not the creditor, equity holder, or partner has accepted
the plan. See id. § 1141(a).
3. Id. § 1123.
4. See id. § 1125.
5. Id. § 1129(a) provides that:
The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met:
(1) The plan complies with the applicable provisions of this chapter.
(2) The proponent of the plan complies with the applicable provisions of this
chapter.
(3) The plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by
law.
(4)(A) Any payment made or promised by the proponent, by the debtor, or by a
person issuing securities or acquiring property under the plan, for services or for costs
and expenses in, or in connection with, the case, or in connection with the plan and
incident to the case, has been disclosed to the court; and
(B)(i) any such payment made before confirmation of the plan is reasonable; or
(ii) if such payment is to be fixed after confirmation of the plan, such
payment is subject to the approval of the court as reasonable.
(5)(A)(i) The proponent of the plan has disclosed the identity and affiliations of
any individual proposed to serve, after confirmation of the plan, as a director, officer, or
voting trustee of the debtor, an affiliate of the debtor participating in a joint plan with the
debtor, or a successor to the debtor under the plan; and
(ii) The appointment to, or continuance in, such office of such individual, is
consistent with the interests of creditors and equity security holders and with public
policy.
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These conditions include good faith on the part of the plan's propo-
nent;6 the disclosure of payments relating to the plan and the case and
of the identity of proposed directors, officers, or voting trustees; the
payment of administrative claims; and the feasibility of the plan.
The confirmation of a plan does not, however, require that it be
accepted by all claim holders and equity holders whose rights are mod-
ified by the plan. If the other conditions for confirmation specified in
section 1129(a) are met, a plan may be confirmed when it has been
(B) The proponent of the plan has disclosed the identity of any insider that will
be employed or retained by the reorganized debtor, and the nature of any compensation
for such insider.
(6) Any regulatory commission with jurisdiction, after confirmation of the plan,
over the rates of the debtor has approved any rate change provided for in the plan, or
such rate change is expressly conditioned on such approval.
(7) With respect to each class-
(A) each holder of a claim or interest of such class-
(i) has accepted the plan; or
(ii) will receive or retain under the plan on account of such claim or
interest property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than
the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated
under chapter 7 of this title on such date; or
(B) if section 111 l(b)(2) of this title applies to the claims of such class, each
holder of a claim of such class will receive or retain under the plan on account of such
claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the
value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in the property that secures such
claims.
(8) With respect to each class-
(A) such class has accepted the plan; or
(B) such class is not impaired under the plan.
(9) Except to the extent that the holder of a particular claim has agreed to a
different treatment of such claim, the plan provides that-
(A) with respect to a claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(1) or 507(a)(2)
of this title, on the effective date of the plan, the holder of such claim will receive on
account of such claim cash equal to the allowed amount of such claim;
(B) with respect to a class of a kind specified in section 507(a)(3), 507(a)(4), or
507(a)(5) of this title, each holder of a claim of such class will receive-
(i) if such class has accepted the plan, deferred cash payments of a value,
as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) if such class has not accepted the plan, cash on the effective date of the
plan equal to the allowed amount of such claim; and
(C) with respect to a claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(6) of this title,
the holder of such claim will receive on account of such claim deferred cash payments,
over a period not exceeding six years after the date of assessment of such claim, of a
value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim.
(10) At least one class of claims has accepted the plan, determined without includ-
ing any acceptance of the plan by any insider holding a claim of such class.
(11) Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the
need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to debtor under
the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan.
Id. § 1129(a).
6. A "proponent" is the party who proposes the plan. Under § 1121 of the Code, a party in
interest other than the debtor may file a plan if a trustee has been appointed or if the debtor does
not file a plan and obtain acceptances of same within the time periods specified. Id. § 1121.
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"accepted" by all classes of claims and equity interests that are "im-
paired"7 by the plan.' A class of claims is deemed to have "accepted" a
plan if it is accepted by the holders of at least two-thirds in amount and
more than one-half in number of the allowed claims of the class held
by creditors two-thirds who actually vote on the plan.' A class of inter-
ests is deemed to have "accepted" the plan if it is accepted by the hold-
ers of at least two-thirds in amount of the allowed interests in the class
that vote on the plan. 10 Thus, a plan may be confirmed despite the
existence of dissenting minorities within one or more classes.
Moreover, a plan may be confirmed even when it is not accepted
by all impaired classes." Indeed, the Code is susceptible to the con-
struction that a plan might be confirmed even if it is not accepted by
any impaired class. 2 The statutory provisions that permit a plan to be
confirmed over the opposition of a dissenting class or classes are often
referred to as the "cram down" provisions. 3
7. Section 1124 of the Code provides that a class of claims or interests is "impaired" by a
plan unless one of the following three conditions is met with respect to each claim or interest
within the class:
(1) The plan does not alter the legal, equitable, or contractual rights of the claim or interest.
(2) The plan simply provides for the cure of any default that gave rise to an acceleration of
the claim or interest, reinstates the maturity of the claim or interest as it existed before the default,
and compensates the holder of the claim or interest for any damages incurred in reasonable reli-
ance on the provision permitting acceleration; or
(3) The holder of the claim or interest will, in the case of the holder of a claim, receive cash
equal to the allowed amount of the claim, or, in the case of the holder of an equity interest, receive
any fixed liquidation preference to which the equity holder is entitled or any fixed price for which
the debtor might redeem the security. Id. § 1124.
8. See id. § 1129(a)(8).
9. Id. § 1126(c).
10. Id. § 1126(d).
11. Seeid.§1129(b).
12. Although id. § 1129(a)(10) requires that at least one class of claims accept the plan, a
class of claims that is not impaired will automatically be deemed to have accepted the plan. See
id. § 1126(0. Thus, unless § 1129(a)(I0) is construed to require that there must be an affirmative
acceptance of the plan by at least one impaired class, the requirement of § 1129(a)(l0) could
apparently be met by leaving one class unimpaired. See generally note 7 supra.
13. The term "cram down" was originally applied to those provisions of the old Bankruptcy
Act, (codified in former 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976) (repealed 1978)), that permitted plans under
Chapter X of the Act, (codified in former 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1976) (repealed 1978)), and under
Chapter XII of the Act, (codified in former 11 U.S.C. §§ 801-926 (1976) (repealed 1978)), to be
confirmed over the opposition of a dissenting class if the plan met certain economic criteria with
respect to the dissenting class. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 579, 616(7)-(8), 861(11), 868 (1976) (repealed
1978).
The situation in which a plan is confirmed despite the existence of a nonconsenting class of
impaired claims or interests is to be distinguished from the situation in which a plan is confirmed
despite the existence of a dissenting minority of claims or interests within a class that has accepted
the plan by the requisite majority. The term "cram down" does not apply to the latter situation,
even though the nonconsenting parties may feel that the plan is being crammed down their
throats.
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The Code attempts to protect dissenting claim holders, equity
holders, and classes who will be bound by a plan by requiring that, in
order for the plan to be confirmed, the value of the property to be re-
ceived under the plan by any holder of a claim or interest who does not
accept the plan, and by any class that does not accept the plan, must
meet certain statutorily defined standards of adequacy.' 4 The stan-
dards of adequacy of value that must be met by the proposed distribu-
tion with respect to dissenting claim holders or equity holders within a
class that has accepted the plan differ from those that must be met with
respect to dissenting classes under the "cram down" provisions.-, In
either event, the determination of whether the proposed distribution to
dissenters meets the applicable standards of adequacy of consideration
will require a valuation of the property to be received by dissenting
claim holders, equity holders, and classes under the plan, and, in the
case of a dissenting secured creditor, a valuation of that creditor's inter-
est in its collateral. This Article will examine the standards of ade-
quacy of value that must be met by the proposed distribution to
dissenting claim holders, equity holders, and classes under a plan, and
the methods of valuation that will probably be used in implementing
those standards.
II. CLASSIFICATION OF CLAIMS AND INTERESTS
.4 General Principles of Classfication
The concept of a "class" of claims or interests is critical in deter-
mining the adequacy of the proposed distribution to dissenters under a
plan. The economic protection that the holder of a given claim or in-
terest must receive under the plan in order for it to be confirmed will
depend on whether the class of which the claim or interest is a part has
accepted the plan. If the class has not accepted the plan, each claim or
interest in the class will be entitled to the additional protection afforded
to dissenting classes under the cram down provisions.' 6 In addition,
the protection to which a claim holder or equity holder is entitled will
depend on whether the claim or interest is part of a junior or senior
class. 17 Hence, a grasp of the basic principles of classification is essen-
tial to a proper understanding of the cram down provisions.
14. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1129(a)(7), I 129(b) (West 1979).
15. Compare id. § 1129(a)(7) with id. § 1129(b).
16. See id. § 1129(b).
17. See text accompanying notes 104-110 infra. Proper classification of claims and interests
is also important because each holder of a claim or interest within a given class must receive the
928 [Vol. 58
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The Code provides that a claim or equity interest may be placed in
a particular class only if it is "substantially similar" to the other claims
or interests in the class."' The legislative history suggests that this sec-
tion is intended to codify the case law under the former Bankruptcy
Act'9 regarding the proper classification of claims and interests.20 The
cardinal principle of classification under the former Bankruptcy Act
was that creditors or equity holders of equal rank, with claims against
the same property, should be placed in the same class, whereas credi-
tors or equity holders of different ranks, or whose claims are against
different property, should be separately classified.2' The Code, how-
ever, may have altered this basic principle.
The Code identifies three general classes--secured claims, un-
secured claims, and "interests."22 Separate classifications, however,
may be required or permitted within each of these general classes. For
example, secured creditors who hold liens on different items of prop-
erty, or who hold liens of a different rank on the same property, should
be separately classified.23 As a practical matter, each secured claim is
likely to be in a separate class, unless two or more creditors have liens
of equal rank on the same property.
With respect to unsecured creditors, cases under the former Bank-
ruptcy Act held that unsecured claims should ordinarily be placed in a
same treatment under the plan, unless such holder agrees to accept less favorable treatment. See
11 U.S.C.A. § 1123(a)(4) (West 1979).
18. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1122(a) (West 1979). A statutory exception to this principle permits a plan
to "designate a separate class of claims consisting only of every unsecured claim that is less than or
[is] reduced to an amount that the court approves as reasonable and necessary for administrative
convenience." Id. § 1122(b).
19. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976) (repealed 1978).
20. See H.R. REP. No. 595,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 406, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
Ad. NEws 5963, 6362 [hereinafter cited as H.R. RaP.].
21. See, e.g., Scherck v. Newton, 152 F.2d 747, 751 (10th Cir. 1945); In re Los Angeles Land
& Investments, Ltd., 282 F. Supp. 448, 453 (D. Haw. 1968); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY pt. 2,
9.10, 9.12 (14th ed. 1978).
22. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b) (West 1979). The term "interest" is not defined in the Act.
The legislative history indicates, however, that the term refers to the ownership rights a share-
holder, limited or general partner, or sole proprietor has in the enterprise. See 124 CONG. REC.
HI 1,093 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards) [hereinafter cited as HousE REc-
ORD]; 124 CONG. REC. S17,410 (daily ed. October 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini) [hereinaf-
ter cited as SENATE REcoRD].
23. See Mokava Corp. v. Dolan, 147 F.2d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1945) (error to lump two first
mortgages on different property into one class); Kyser v. MacAdam, 117 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir.
1941) (mortgage that was either prior to or subordinate to mechanics' liens should not be placed in
same class with those liens); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Champion Shoe Mach. Co., 109 F.2d
313, 316 (8th Cir. 1940) (when series of bonds was secured by same collateral, but payment of
some had been subordinated to payment to others, two groups of bonds should have been sepa-
rately classified).
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single class, regardless of any difference in the basis of the claims.24
This result may not be required under the Code. Section 1122 of the
Code,25 which governs classification, does not require that all claims or
interests that are substantially similar be placed in the same class; in-
stead, it simply provides that a particular claim or interest may be
placed in a particular class only if it is "substantially similar" to other
claims or interests in a class. This requirement could be met even if the
unsecured claims were subclassified into a number of different classes
of equal rank. For example, if the plan divided the unsecured claims
into bank debt and "trade" debt, a claim in either subclass would be
"substantially similar" to the other claims in the subclass.
Other provisions of the Code also suggest that claims of equal rank
might be subclassified. Section 1102(a)(1) provides that the court shall
appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims.26 Section
1102(b)(1) requires that such a committee ordinarily consist of those
willing to serve that hold the seven largest claims against the debtor
of the kinds represented on such committee, or of the members of a
committee organized by creditors before the order for relief under
this chapter, if that committee was fairly chosen and is representative
of the different kinds of claims to be represented. 7
Thus, the Code contemplates that there may be different "kinds" of
unsecured claims, that the interests or viewpoint of the holders of cer-
tain kinds of unsecured claims might differ from those of the holders of
other kinds of claims, and that each of the various kinds of unsecured
claims should be represented on the unsecured creditors committee in
order to ensure that the interests of the various types of unsecured
claim holders are adequately represented.28
On the other hand, there are at least two considerations that sug-
gest that the subclassification of unsecured claims ordinarily ought not
to be permitted. First, section 1122(b) specifically permits a plan to
24. That unsecured claims might take different forms, such as notes, accounts, written con-
tracts, torts, or the like, was held not to justify separate classification. See, e.g., In re Los Angeles
Land & Investments, Ltd., 282 F. Supp. 448, 454 (D. Haw. 1968).
25. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1122 (West 1979).
26. Id. § 1102(a)(l).
27. Id. § 1102(b)(1).
28. Regarding the subclassification of claims of equal rank, § 1129(b)(1) requires that in or-
der for a plan to be confirmed, it must not "discriminate unfairly" against any dissenting class. IM.
§ 1129(b)(1). This requirement appears designed to ensure nondiscriminatory treatment of a dis-
senting class vis-A-vis other classes of equal rank. Although its primary concern is apparently the
situation in which classes of equal rank occupy unequal positions with respect to the claims of a
third class because of a partial subordination of claims of the third class, the requirement would
appear to apply even absent a partial subordination agreement.
[Vol. 58930
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"designate a separate class of claims consisting only of every unsecured
claim that is less than or reduced to an amount that the court approves
as reasonable and necessary for administrative convenience."2 9 This
provision would be unnecessary if section 1122(a) permitted the sub-
classification of claims of the same rank.
Second, section 1123(a)(4)30 requires that a plan provide the same
treatment for each claim or interest in a particular class, unless the
holder of a particular claim or interest in the class agrees to less
favorable treatment. It is hard to believe that Congress intended to
permit the proponent of a plan to circumvent this requirement by sepa-
rately classifying certain claims that are to be treated less favorably
than others of equal rank. Were this method of classification allowed,
the majority of the disfavored subclass required to accept the plan
could bind the minority of dissenters to take less favorable treatment
than other claims of equal rank.3
Regardless of whether claims of equal rank may ordinarily be sub-
classified, the existence of contractual subordination agreements among
unsecured creditors will require separate classification of the claims
that benefit from the subordination agreements, the claims that are
contractually subordinated, and the claims that are unaffected by those
agreements.32 Likewise, the interests of stockholders should be sepa-
rately classified if there is preferred and common stock outstanding.33
The Code contemplates that when the claim of a secured creditor
exceeds the value of its collateral, the creditor really has two claims that
should be separately classified. Under section 506(a),34 the allowed
claim 35 of a secured creditor is a secured claim to the extent of the
value of the secured creditor's interest in the collateral,36 and is an un-
29. Id. § 1122(b).
30. Id. § 1123(a)(4).
31. If the class consisting of the claims that were to receive less favorable treatment did not
accept the plan, the plan could not be confirmed unless it was found not to "discriminate unfairly"
against the dissenting class. See id. § 1129(b). There appears, however, to be no requirement that
a plan not discriminate unfairly against a class that ha accepted the plan. See id. § 1129(a).
32. See Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 21, % 9.10 at 1602. See generally H.R. REP., supra
note 20, at 416-17, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6372-73. Section 510(a)
of the Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 5 10(a) (West 1979), recognizes the enforceability of subordination
agreements in bankruptcy.
33. Cf. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1102(b)(2) (West 1979) (referring to "kinds" of equity securities).
34. Id. § 506(a).
35. The term "allowed claim" apparently refers to the amount in which a claim is allowed
after applying the rules governing the allowance of claims and interests contained in §§ 502 and
506 of the Code. See id. §§ 502, 506.
36. The Code speaks not of "collateral," but of "the creditor's interest in the estate's interest
in the property." Id. § 506. The use of the phrase "the estate's interest in the property" makes it
19801
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secured claim to the extent that the value of the secured creditor's inter-
est in the collateral is less than the amount of the allowed claim. Thus,
the claim of an inadequately secured creditor would be considered a
secured claim only to the extent of the value of the collateral, and an
unsecured claim to the extent of the deficiency. Moreover, if the se-
cured creditor's claim is a nonrecourse claim-that is, one for which
the creditor has recourse only to the collateral and has no recourse
against the debtor for any unsecured deficiency-the creditor would
have only a secured claim equal to the value of the collateral, and no
claim for the unsecured deficiency.
B. The Section 1111(b) Election
The result of applying section 506(a) to the claim of a secured
creditor is altered in a Chapter 11 case by the provisions of section
1111(b) of the Code.37 Basically, section 1111(b) has two ramifications.
First, an inadequately collateralized secured creditor holding a nonre-
course claim who would not otherwise be entitled to recover its un-
secured deficiency against the debtor may have a claim for that
deficiency. In this regard, section 111 (b)(1) provides that a secured
claim is to be allowed or disallowed just as if the holder of the claim
had personal recourse against the debtor on account of the claim,
whether or not such recourse would otherwise be available under appli-
clear that when parties other than the debtor hold an interest in the collateral, the secured claim
would be limited to the value of the debtor's interest in the property--as opposed to the entire
value of the property. Use of the phrase "the creditor's interest in" would seem designed to make
it clear that the focus is on what the creditor has after deducting prior liens on, or other interests
in, the debtor's interest in the property. Although the statute's phraseology is technically more
accurate, the term "collateral" is substituted in this Article in the interest of simplification.
37. Id. § 1111(b) provides that:
(b)(1)(A) A claim secured by a lien on property of the estate shall be allowed or
disallowed under section 502 of this title the same as if the holder of such claim had
recourse against the debtor on account of such claim, whether or not such holder has
such recourse, unless-
(i) The class of which such claim is a part elects, by at least two-thirds
in amount and more than half in number of allowed claims of such class, applica-
tion of paragraph (2) of this subsection; or
(ii) such holder does not have such recourse and such property is sold
under section 363 of this title or is to be sold under the plan.
(B) A class of claims may not elect application of paragraph (2) of this
subsection if-
(i) the interest on account of such claims of the holders of such claims
in such property is of inconsequential value; or
(ii) the holder of a claim of such class has recourse against the debtor
on account of such claim and such property is sold under section 363 of this title or
is to be sold under the plan.
(2) If such an election is made, then notwithstanding section 506(a) of this title,
such claim is a secured claim to the extent that such claim is allowed.
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cable state law, unless (1) the claim is a nonrecourse claim and the
property is sold or is to be sold under the plan; or (2) the class of which
the claim is a part elects to have the claim treated as a nonrecourse
claim under section 111 l(b)(2).
Second, with certain exceptions, a class of secured claims, whether
recourse or nonrecourse, may elect to have its claims treated as nonre-
course claims under section 111l(b)(2). 38 The result of making this
election is that the secured creditor is deemed to have a secured claim
equal to the full amount of its allowed claim, instead of a secured claim
equal only to the value of its collateral, and no claim for an unsecured
deficiency. For example, a creditor with a recourse claim who is owed
a debt of $100,000, the payment of which is secured by property worth
$60,000, will have a secured claim for $60,000 and an unsecured claim
for $40,000 if the creditor does not make the section l111(b) election.
The same creditor would have a secured claim for $100,000 and no
unsecured claim if the creditor made the section 1111(b) election.
Despite the apparent complexities involved in the section 1111 (b)
election, the effect of the election is simple: an inadequately collateral-
ized secured creditor who would otherwise have had a secured claim
equal only to the value of its collateral will be deemed to have a se-
cured claim equal to the full amount of its claim, but will be precluded
from having any unsecured deficiency claim. The difference resulting
from the section 111 (b) election will be felt most keenly in the context
of determining whether a Chapter 11 plan can be confirmed over the
secured creditor's dissent.
III. TESTING THE ADEQUACY OF THE PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION TO
DISSENTING MINORITIES-THE "LIQUIDATION
ALTERNATIVE" APPROACH
Section 1129(a)(7) of the Code3 9 sets forth the minimum standard
of value that the proposed distribution under a plan must meet with
respect to dissenting claim holders and equity holders for the plan to be
confirmed. Under section 1129(a)(7)(A), each claim holder or equity
holder who does not accept the plan, other than the holder of a secured
38. This election is not available when the creditor's interest in the collateral is of inconse-
quential value, or when the claim is a recourse claim and the collateral is sold under the plan. See
11 U.S.C. § Ill l(b)(l)(B) (West 1979). A typical situation in which the secured creditor's interest
in the property may be of inconsequential value is when the collateral is insufficient, or barely
sufficient, to satisfy encumbrances senior to that of the secured creditor.
39. Id. § 1129(a)(7).
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claim who has made the section 1111 (b) election, must receive or retain
on account of the claim or interest property having a value, as of the
"effective date of the plan,"4 not less than the amount that the dis-
senter would receive or retain were the debtor to be liquidated in a
straight bankruptcy liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Code.41 The
manifest purpose of this requirement is to ensure that dissenters are no
worse off under the plan than they would be if the debtor were simply
liquidated. This concept represents a codification of the judicial gloss
placed on the "best interest of creditors" test that applied to the confir-
mation of plans under Chapter XI of the old Bankruptcy Act 42 and is
likely to be referred to as the "best interests" test.
A different standard applies to the dissenting holder of a secured
claim that is part of a class that has made the section 1111 (b) election.43
Under section 1129(a)(7)(B), 44 each holder of a secured claim within
such a class must receive or retain property whose value as of the effec-
tive date of the plan is no less than the value of the creditor's interest in
the collateral. This special standard apparently is necessary because
there is no analogue to the section 1111 (b) election in a straight bank-
ruptcy proceeding under Chapter 7 of the Code. Absent the special
provisions of section 1129(a)(7)(B), the holder of a recourse claim that
was part of a class that had made the section 1111 (b) election to give up
the claim for any unsecured deficiency might successfully contend that,
40. The concept of the "effective date of the plan" is important under the Code because that
is the date as of which the value of the proposed distribution to dissenting claim holders, equity
holders, and classes must be tested. Nevertheless, the Code does not define the phrase, It has
been suggested that this date should correspond to the first day after the order confirming the plan
becomes final. See Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bank-
ruptey Code, 53 AM. BANKR. LJ. 133, 137 n.24 (1979). This approach would make it impossible,
however, to make any of the valuations that may become necessary in order to determine whether
the plan can be confirmed, because the likelihood of an appeal from the confirmation order and
the date when the appeal will be resolved cannot be determined in advance of confirmation.
Ordinarily, the "effective date of the plan" should probably conform to the date the plan is
confirmed, because the plan becomes "effective" to the extent of eliminating creditor and stock-
holder rights not preserved in the plan upon confirmation. See II U.S.C.A. § 1141 (West 1979).
On the other hand, the choice of the term "effective date" rather than "confirmation date" sug-
gests that the two need not invariably coincide, and that the plan might designate some other
effective date.
41. II U.S.C.A. §§ 701-728 (West 1979).
42. Under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, a plan that was not unanimously approved by
each class of creditors affected by the plan had to be in the "best interests of creditors" in order to
be confirmed. Bankruptcy Act § 366(2), 11 U.S.C. § 766(2) (1976) (repealed 1978). The "best
interests" test was interpreted judicially to require that creditors receive something more than they
would receive on a straight liquidation in bankruptcy. See generally 9 Collier on Bankruocy,
supra note 21, at 9.17.
43. See generaly text accompanying notes 29 & 30 supra.
44. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(7)(B) (West 1979).
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because it would be entitled to an unsecured deficiency in a Chapter 7
liquidation, the value of the property that it is to receive under the plan
must include not only what it would receive upon a liquidation of its
collateral, but also the dividend that it would receive on its unsecured
deficiency in a Chapter 7 liquidation.45 Subsection (B) of section
1129(a)(7) precludes this argument by limiting the value of the property
that must be received on account of a claim within a class that has
made the section 1111 (b) election to the value of the claimant's interest
in the collateral.46
The application of the "best interests" test, and the special test for
creditors who have made the section 111 (b) election, to the proposed
distribution to dissenting claim holders and interest holders will require
a valuation of the proposed distribution to the dissenters and, in the
case of a dissenting secured creditor, a valuation of the creditor's inter-
est in the collateral. The method of valuation that is likely to be used
for these purposes is discussed elsewhere in this Article.47
IV. CRAMMING DowN THE DISSENTING CLASS OF CLAIMS OR
INTERESTS
Section 1129(a)(8) of the Code48 requires that, in order for a plan
to be confirmed, each class that is impaired under the plan must accept
the plan by the requisite majority vote. Section 1129(b)(1) goes on,
however, to provide that if all of the requirements for confirmation
other than this requirement are met, then, notwithstanding the require-
ments of section 1129(a)(8), the plan should be confirmed on request of
the proponent of the plan "if the plan does not discriminate unfairly,
and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or inter-
ests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan."4 9 Thus, in
45. This argument could not plausibly be made by the holder of a claim that would be nonre-
course under state law or the terms of the obligation because the provisions of § 111 l(b), which
accord the nonrecourse secured creditor recourse status, apply only in a Chapter 11 case and not
to a Chapter 7 liquidation.
46. See House REcoRD, supra note 22, at Hll,105; SENATE REcoRD, supra note 22, at
S17,421-22.
47. See text accompanying notes 120-27 infra.
48. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(8) (West 1979).
49. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(1) provides as follows:
(b)(1) Notwithstanding Section 5 10(a) of this title, if all of the applicable require-
ments of subsection (a) of this section other than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a
plan, the court, on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan notwith-
standing the requirements of such paragraph if the plan does not discriminate unfairly,
and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired
under, and has not accepted, the plan.
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order for a plan to be "crammed down" over the opposition of a dis-
senting class, the plan must meet two requirements with respect to each
dissenting class-it must not "discriminate unfairly" and it must be
"fair and equitable."
A. The Requirement That a Plan Not Discriminate Unfairly
The Code itself does not articulate any standards for determining
whether a plan "discriminates unfairly" with respect to a dissenting
class. Nevertheless, the scope of the antidiscrimination requirement
contained in section 1129 is suggested by considering what it does not
cover. Section 1123(a) of the Code, which sets forth the required con-
tents of a plan, already covers discrimination among members of a
given class.50 The treatment to be accorded to a class vis-A-vis unequal
classes is dealt with by the "fair and equitable" requirement, which,
when applicable, requires that a senior class be compensated in full
before a junior class may participate in the plan.5 ' By process of elimi-
nation, therefore, the requirement that a plan not "discriminate un-
fairly" seems to be designed to ensure that the dissenting class is not
treated in an unfairly discriminatory manner vis-A-vis other classes of
equal rank.52 This standard is most likely to come into play when two
classes of equal rank occupy unequal positions with respect to a third
class.53
This situation typically arises when certain creditors have
subordinated their claims to the claims of some, but not all, of the cred-
itors who would otherwise fall within the same class absent the subor-
dination agreement. For example, the unsecured claims may include
debts to suppliers or "trade" debt; bank debt; and debentures that are
contractually subordinated to the bank debt, but not to the trade debt.
Absent the subordination agreement, all three types of claims would
fall within the single class of unsecured claims. Because of the subordi-
nation agreement involving the debentures and the bank debt, how-
ever, it becomes necessary to subclassify the unsecured creditors into
Id. § 1129(b)(1).
50. Id. § 1123(a)(4) provides that a plan shall "provide the same treatment for each claim or
interest of a particular class, unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less
favorable treatment of such particular claim or interest."
51. See generally text accompanying notes 86-110 infra.
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three classes.5 4 In such a case, the class of bank claims would be senior
to the class of debenture claims, but each of those classes would be of
equal rank with the trade debt, which is not affected by the subordina-
tion agreement. The "fair and equitable" requirement would, if appli-
cable, govern the fairness of the distribution as between the senior bank
debt and the subordinated debenture debt." The antidiscrimination
requirement would govern the treatment of the dissenting subclass with
respect to the subclass or subclasses to which it is equal.
The antidiscrimination requirement mandates that the subordina-
tion agreement be enforced to the extent of its terms, but no more. Ac-
cordingly, any subclass consisting of claims that are neither
subordinated nor the beneficiaries of any subordination agreement
should receive its aliquot share of the total distribution made under the
plan on account of all of the claims that would otherwise fall within the
same class absent the subordination agreement. The aliquot share of
that total distribution to which the subordinated creditors would other-
wise be entitled should be paid over to the beneficiaries of the subordi-
nation agreement up to the amount which, when added to the
beneficiaries' aliquot share of the total distribution, would cause them
to receive property of a value equal to their allowed claims.5 6
For example, suppose that unsecured debt includes $100,000 in
trade debt, $200,000 in bank debt, and $100,000 in debentures, and the
debentures contain a provision subordinating the claims of the deben-
ture holders to the claims of the banks. The plan provides for an aggre-
gate distribution of $60,000 to the three classes of unsecured claims.
The plan would not unfairly discriminate against any of the three
classes if it provided for the payment of $15,000 to the class of trade
creditors, $45,000 to the class of bank creditors, and nothing to the class
of debenture holders. Under this distribution the trade creditors would
receive exactly what they would have received under the plan had there
been no subordination agreement (that is, 25 percent of $60,000), and
the $15,000 dividend that would otherwise have gone to the class of
debenture holders as its aliquot share of the distribution absent the sub-
ordination agreement is instead paid over to the holders of the bank
54. See id. See generally text accompanying note 32 supra; 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 21, 9.10 at 1602-03 (discussing Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act).
55. See generally text accompanying notes 86-110 infra.
56. Cf. Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin, 78 F.2d 371, 372 (8th Cir. 1935) (dividend that
would ordinarily be paid to creditors who signed subordination agreement should be withheld and
paid over to beneficiaries of agreement until beneficiaries' claims are paid in full). See generally
H.R. REp., supra note 20, at 416-17, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6372-73.
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debt, who have not been paid in full. The plan would unfairly discrim-
inate against the subclass of trade debt, however, if it received less than
$15,000, and would unfairly discriminate against the subclass of bank
debt if it received less than $45,000.5 7
B. The "Fair and Equitable" Test
1. Application Under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act
The phrase "fair and equitable" is not a newcomer to the nomen-
clature of reorganization. Under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act,58 a
plan had to be "fair and equitable" in order to be approved or con-
firmed, whether or not it was accepted by the requisite majorities of
each class.5 9 The Chapter X requirement that a plan be "fair and equi-
table" was read to embody the "absolute priority" rule, which requires
that each class of claims and interests, in descending rank, must receive
full compensation for any rights surrendered before any junior class
may properly participate in the plan. In other words, "absolute prior-
ity" dictated that junior claims or interests could not participate in the
plan unless there was some equity in the debtor's assets after full satis-
faction of prior claims.6"
The determination of whether a plan was "fair and equitable"
under Chapter X-that is, whether it complied with the "absolute pri-
ority" rule-required a determination of whether there was any value
left for junior classes, and whether senior creditors were being fully
compensated for their rights in a plan in which junior claims or inter-
ests were being permitted to participate.6' A valuation of the debtor
and of the proposed distribution to each class was therefore necessary
before the reorganization court could determine whether the proposed
distribution under a plan was "fair and equitable."62
The method of valuation adopted by the courts for determining
57. The situation can become even more complicated if the debtor has issued two series of
debentures, one of which is subordinated only to certain types of debt (e.g., trade debt), and the
other of which is subordinated to a different type of debt (e.g., bank debt); one series of debentures
is subordinated to the other, and there are claims other than trade debt or bank debt, to which
none of the debentures would be subordinated. In such a case, the unsecured debt would have to
be subclassified into five classes: the two debentures, trade debt, bank debt, and "other" debt.
58. II U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1976) (repealed 1978).
59. See 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1976) (repealed 1978).
60. See 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 111.06 at 206-16 (rev. ed. 1977).
61. See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); 6A COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 60, 1 11.05 at 184-85. Seegenerally 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 21, 9.0211] at 1503-07.
62. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 524-25 (1941).
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the business debtor's "reorganization value ' 63 was the "going concern"
value based on a capitalization of prospective earnings.64 This ap-
proach was justified by the fact that the very purpose of a reorganiza-
tion proceeding is to avoid a forced sale of assets and to preserve the
going concern value of the business by continuing its operations. It is
incongruous to value a business that is being reorganized on the basis
of the price its assets could fetch on a piecemeal liquidation when the
entire theory of the reorganization is that the debtor is being preserved
as a going concern. Accordingly, the business was properly valued as
an integrated unit, not as discrete pieces of property to be sold. More-
over, the use of going concern value was thought to free reorganization
value from prices pegged by forced sales, temporary conditions of the
market place, or an artificially depressed market caused by the reorgan-
ization proceeding itself.65
The use of "going concern value" for purposes of applying the ab-
solute priority rule could also be justified as consistent with the judg-
ment. underlying that rule. The rule reflected judicial rejection of the
philosophy that a plan permitting junior interests to participate without
fully compensating senior classes could be justified because the senior
classes would fare even worse under a forced liquidation.66 On the
contrary, the judgment underlying the absolute priority rule was that
the prospective value of the debtor as a going concern should not be
appropriated by junior classes until senior classes share in that prospec-
tive value to the full extent of their claims.67 Consistent with this phi-
losophy, the debtor was properly valued on a going concern basis in
order to permit junior classes to obtain any going concern value that
exists over and above the value necessary to satisfy the claims of senior
classes.
Because "going concern value" will continue to be used for certain
purposes under the Code,68 it is important to understand that method
of valuation. Although the valuation of an enterprise on the basis of a
capitalization of prospective earnings is a difficult process, the theory is
63. The term "reorganization value" refers to the value of the reorganized debtor. See In re
Equity Funding Corp. of Am., 391 F. Supp. 768, 772 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
64. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (!941); In re Equity Funding
Corp. of Am., 391 F. Supp. 768, 772 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Note, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act
Changes in the Absolute Priority Rulefor Corporate Reorganizations, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1786, 1793
(1974).
65. See In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am., 391 F. Supp. 768, 772-73 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
66. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
67. See In re Dutch Woodcraft Shops, 14 F. Supp. 467, 469 (W.D. Mich. 1935).
68. See text accompanying note 149 infra.
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simple. A projected stream of income in the future has a discounted
present value based upon an interest factor, to account for the time
value of money, and a risk factor, to account for the possibility that the
projected stream of income may never be realized. The process of en-
terprise valuation thus requires projecting the enterprise's income
stream and then determining a discounted present value for that in-
come stream by multiplying the average annual projected income by a
multiplier based on an appropriate capitalization rate.69
Thus, the determination of the debtor's value as a going concern
actually requires two determinations. First, the future earnings of the
reorganized debtor must be projected. These projections must be
based, not on past earnings alone, but on factors that may influence
income in the future. 0 Of course, mathematical precision in these pro-
jections is neither possible nor required.7 '
Second, once earnings are projected, the average annual projected
earnings are discounted to a present value on the basis of a capitaliza-
tion rate that reflects the expected annual rate of return that investors
would require on an investment of comparable risk. This discounting
is accomplished by multiplying the average annual projected earnings
by a multiplier that is the inverse of the capitalization rate. For exam-
ple, if the capitalization rate (that is, the expected rate of return) were
20 percent, the multiplier would be 5; if the capitalization rate were 10
percent, the multiplier would be 10. Thus, the higher the expected rate
of return required by investors, the lower the multiplier and thus the
lower the going concern value of the debtor.
The general standard for determining the appropriate capitaliza-
tion rate is that the capitalization rate should be consonant with the
"'risk factor of the particular enterprise, measured largely by its past
experience and the experiences of businesses similarly situated.' "72
The uncertainty inherent in attempting to fix a capitalization rate can
69. The process of determining reorganization value on the basis of the capitalization of
earnings approach has been explained thusly:
[R]eorganization value is a forecast of future earnings converted to present value by a
capitalization or discount rate. This capitalization or discount rate reflects the expected
annual rate of return on an investment and the choice of this rate is a question ofjudg-
ment which must reasonably relate to the rates of return generally expected by investors
from comparable investment opportunities.
In re Equity Funding Corp., 391 F. Supp. 768, 772 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
70. Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414,451-53 (1968) (lower court erred in relying
only on past earnings as basis for valuation).
71. See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941).
72. 6A COLLIER ON BANKRupTcY, su.pra note 60, 11.05 at 199 (quoting Note, Jistribuion of
Securities in Corporale Reorganization, 51 YALE LJ. 85, 90 (1941)).
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be mitigated when a court has available to it information regarding
price/earnings ratios employed in the sale of comparable enterprises
under more or less similar conditions, or capitalization rates employed
in fixing the market price of securities of comparable companies. 73
There were two exceptions under old Chapter X, however, to the
use of going concern valuation to determine reorganization value.
First, nonproductive assets, such as excess working capital or cash, ex-
cess or abandoned plants, other nonproductive real or personal prop-
erty held for liquidation, and generally any assets not necessary to
produce the anticipated income stream, would be valued separately
and their value added to going concern value in determining reorgani-
zation value.74 Conversely, if additional working capital had to be in-
fused into the debtor in order to enable it to achieve the projected
income stream, that amount was deducted from reorganization value.75
Second, when a valuation based on liquidation was higher than one
based on projected future earnings, liquidation was the appropriate
method of valuation because liquidation was the only economically
justifiable course of action.76
Once the "reorganization value" of the debtor was computed in
the manner outlined above, that value would be used as the basis for
valuing the securities to be distributed to particular classes in order to
determine whether senior classes were being fully compensated. The
value ascribed to the equity securities that were to be distributed pursu-
73. Gardner, The SECand Valuation Under Chapter X, 91 U. PA. L. Rav. 440,453 (1943); see
In re Yuba Consol. Indus., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (capitalization rates deter-
mined with reference to average price/earnings ratios on sales of stock of similar companies).
74. See Gardner, supra note 73, at 443; 6A Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 60, 111.05 at
200.
Tax savings that may result from using a tax loss carry forward to offset future earnings also
belong in this category of nonproductive or "excess" assets. Because the use of a tax loss carry
forward to effect tax savings is an extraordinary and nonrecurring item, projected earnings are
estimated without accounting for tax savings that will result from the use of a tax loss carry for-
ward. The present value of the anticipated use of the tax loss to effect tax savings in the future-
t e., the discounted value of the tax savings that are expected to result from using the tax loss-is
then added to the going concern value of the company to determine its reorganization value. See
In re Yuba Consol. Indus., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 561, 566 (N.D. Cal. 1965); In re Third Ave. Transit
Corp., 37 S.E.C. 258, 270 (1957) (capitalized earnings augmented by amount of excess cash and
discounted value of tax benefit of use of tax loss carry forwards); In re Green River Steel Corp., 37
S.E.C. 507, 519-20, 522-23 (1957); In re Northeastern Steel Corp., 38 S.E.C. 41, 53 (1957) (upward
adjustment in value made to take into account ability to use past losses to reduce federal income
taxes payable in future profitable years).
75. See, eg., In re Northeastern Steel Corp., 38 S.E.C. 41, 52-53 (1957) (capitalized value
decreased to reflect additional investment in plants necessary to produce projected income
stream).
76. See In re Porto Rican Am. Tobacco Co., 112 F.2d 655, 656-57 (2d Cir. 1940); 6A CoL-
LIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 60, 111.05 at 200-01.
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ant to a plan of reorganization would be the difference between the
reorganization value of the enterprise as a whole and the indebtedness
with which the reorganized company would emerge under the plan.
For example, if the value of the debtor on a "going concern" basis was
found to be $11 million and the plan provided for the debtor to emerge
with indebtedness of $6 million, the equity securities to be issued under
the plan would be valued at $5 nmillion.7 7 The actual market value of
the securities issued by the reorganized debtor immediately following
their issuance would not necessarily correspond to the "reorganization
value" of those securities. 78 Nevertheless, it was deemed appropriate to
use the "investment" value or "intrinsic" value of the securities, based
on a "going concern" valuation, rather than "spot market value" as the
basis for valuation.79
One might think that if the "going concern" valuation of the
debtor were conducted correctly, the market value of its securities
should correspond to their value based on a capitalization of antici-
pated income. Nevertheless, at least two explanations could be offered
for a discrepancy between the two values, especially in the period im-
mediately following reorganization. First, the capitalization rate used
to determine going concern value is likely to be determined with refer-
ence to price/earnings ratios of stock in other companies in the same
industry. The "comparable" companies whose stocks are used to arrive
at a capitalization rate, however, may be something less than fully com-
parable to the debtor because they have not just emerged from a Chap-
ter 11 reorganization and they have an earnings record more consistent
and reliable than that of the debtor. In the short term, at least, one
would expect investors to demand a higher rate of return than is avail-
able from investments in the "comparable" companies to compensate
them for the greater perceived risk of investing in the resuscitated
debtor. Second, investors simply may not believe the projections of in-
come that were used to value the debtor, and thus they may wait to see
if projections, which may deviate sharply from the debtor's past earn-
ings or loss experience, are borne out.
The use of "going concern" value assumes that, regardless of
short-run market reaction to the debtor's securities, the value of the
77. See In re Northeastern Steel Corp., 38 S.E.C. REP. 41, 59 (1957).
78. Cf. In re New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 304 F. Supp. 793, 808-09 (D. Conn. 1969), modoed,
399 U.S. 392 (1970) (value ascribed to stock on basis of anticipated earnings exceeded market
price by $20 million).
79. See id.; In re Equity Funding Corp., 391 F. Supp. 768, 772 (C.D. Cal. 1975); In re Green
River Steel Corp., 37 S.E.C. 507, 527-28 (1957).
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debtor's stock should conform to its reorganization value in the long
run,8 0 presumably because the market will eventually recognize the
"intrinsic value" of the debtor's stock. Theoretically, the greater per-
ceived risk, which may cause investors to demand a higher rate of re-
turn on an investment in the reorganized debtor, should diminish as the
debtor continues to operate profitably. The expected result would be
that the price/earnings ratio of the debtor's stock should eventually
correspond to those of other companies in the industry. Nevertheless,
the result of using "going concern" value was that a junior class might
be entitled to participate in a plan under the absolute priority rule, even
though the immediate market value of the securities issued to a senior
class was less than the claims of that senior class, if the "reorganization
value" of the securities issued to the senior class equaled the amount of
the claims of that class.8 '
Another concept that evolved in connection with the implementa-
tion of the absolute priority rule was that senior classes that received a
grade of securities equivalent to that given to junior classes should be
compensated for their loss of priority by receiving securities with a "re-
organization value" in excess of the amount of their claims. The re-
quirement of "full compensation" for senior classes was broad enough
to include compensation for a step-down in priority, as well as compen-
sation for the amount of a claim, because the "bundle of rights" of a
senior class included the right to priority. 2 As compensation for its
loss of priority, a creditor could receive securities beyond the amount
whose value would equal the face amount of the creditor's claim.83
Thus, for taking the increased risk of nonpayment posed by the demo-
tion to inferior securities, the creditor would be compensated by the
prospect of recovering something more than the face amount of its
claim if the business succeeded. s4 This principle was known as the
80. See Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CH. L. REV. 565,
571-79 (1950).
81. See generally cases cited in note 79 supra.
82. See In re Imperial '400' Nat'l, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 949, 976-77 (D.N.J. 1974).
83. See In re Inland Gas Corp., 211 F.2d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 1954); Standard Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 117 F.2d 615, 617 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 564 (1941).
84. The principle of the "step-up" can also be justified by the uncertainties involved in com-
puting "reorganization value." On its face, the process of determining reorganization value has a
beguiling air of exactitude because it always produces a dollars and cents figure that looks mathe-
matically precise. The apparent exactitude of the figure, however, disguises the highly inexact
nature of the process of determining going concern value on the basis of a capitalization of pro-
jected future earnings. The process of projecting earnings is an inexact one based on a combina-
tion of past performance, foreseeable capital needs, and estimated revenues and costs. Likewise,
the capitalization rate applied to the projected earnings is a matter ofjudgment, which necessarily
involves many judgments concerning hazards, business stability, and future development. For
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"step-up. ' ' 85
2. The "Fair and Equitable" Test Under Chapter 11 of the Code
The provisions of Chapter 11 represent a marked departure from
the "absolute priority" rule, as it was applied in Chapter X, in one criti-
cal respect. Under Chapter l Ithe absolute priority rule is applied only
to the dissenting class or classes and not to all classes.86 A majority of a
senior class may bind the minority to take something less than "full
compensation" for its rights in a plan in which junior claims or inter-
ests are permitted to participate.8 7 Moreover, senior classes may give
up value to junior classes as long as no dissenting intermediate class
receives property of a lesser value than the amount of its allowed
claims. 8
In addition, unlike Chapter X, Chapter 11 attempts to codify cer-
tain minimum conditions that must be met in order for a plan to be
"fair and equitable" with respect to a given dissenting class.8 9 The leg-
islative history makes it clear, however, that section 1129(b) does not
contain an exhaustive enumeration of the components of the "fair and
equitable" test, and that additional factors beyond those specified in
the statute could be found by the courts to be "fundamental" to "fair
and equitable" treatment of a dissenting class.90 One of these addi-
tional requirements is that a dissenting class should be assured that no
senior class receives more than 100 percent of its claims. 9'
The legislative history also suggests a second additional require-
example, it is difficult to "prove" objectively that a 1001 capitalization rate is "correct" and that an
11% capitalization rate is "incorrect," even though the choice of the capitalization rate may deter-
mine whether there is any value available to the junior classes. See generally Blum & Kaplan, The
Absolute Prioriy Doctrine in Corporate Reorganizations, 41 U. CH . L. REv. 651, 655 (1974).
Among other things, the "step-up" provides the senior class, which has been forced to take inferior
securities, with some protection against the risk that the actual experience of the reorganized
debtor does not correspond to the projections used as the basis for valuing those securities.
85. See, e.g., In re Imperial '400' Nat'l Inc., 374 F. Supp. 949, 976-77 (D.N.J. 1974).
86. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b) (West 1979); H.R. REP., supra note 20, at 413, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6370; House RECORD, supra note 22, at HI 1,104; SEN-
ATE REcoRD, supra note 22, at S17,420.
87. If the requisite majority of the senior class has accepted the plan, then the plan has been
accepted by the class, and the "fair and equitable" test would not apply. See 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 1129(b) (West 1979).
88. See H.R. REP., supra note 20, at 224, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 6184; HousE RECORD, supra note 22, at HI 1,104; SENATE RECORD, sura note 22, at S17,420.
89. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2) (West 1979).
90. See HOUSE RECoRD, supra note 22, at HI1,104; SENATE RECORD, myra note 22, at
S17,420.
91. See H.R. REP., supra note 20, at 414, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEWS
at 6370; House RECORD, supra note 22, at H 11,104; SENATE REcoRD, supra note 22, at S17,420.
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ment: senior creditors who are required to take securities in the reorga-
nized debtor that are of equal priority with the securities given to a
junior class should be compensated for their loss of priority and the
increased risk that they are subjected to by that loss of priority.9 2 The
legislative history suggests that compensation for this loss of priority
should be provided by assigning a lower value to the securities given to
the senior creditors than to comparable securities given to junior credi-
tors who have not lost a priority position. 93 To the extent that the legis-
lative history evinces an intent to continue the requirement of the
"step-up," however, the means suggested for the continued implemen-
tation of that requirement is inaccurate. The principle of the "step-up"
under Chapter X was not predicated upon assigning a lower value to
securities of the reorganized debtor given to one class than to securities
of the same type given to another class. Instead, the value of a share of
stock in the reorganized company was static, regardless of the identity
of the ultimate recipient of the stock, but the senior class was compen-
sated for its loss of priority by the receipt of securities with a "reorgani-
zation value" in excess of the amount of its claims.94 This result would
appear to conflict with the principle that no class should receive more
than 100 percent of its claims.
The legislative history suggests that Congress saw no inconsistency
between the requirement that no class receive more than 100 percent of
its claims and the requirement that senior classes be compensated for a
loss of priority.95 Perhaps one way to resolve any inconsistency is to
recognize that the components of a claim include not only the amount
of the claim, but also the quality of the claim, reflected in its priority,
and the corresponding effect on the likelihood of repayment. Using
this definition of a claim, one can conclude that a post-reorganization
claim or interest greater in amount but lesser in rank and likelihood of
payment than its pre-reorganization counterpart really constitutes no
more than 100 percent of its pre-reorganization value. Regardless of
the mechanics of implementing the step-up, however, Congress appar-
ently intended to continue that concept under the Code.96
92. See H.R. REP., supra note 20, at 414, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 6370.
93. See id.
94. See Standard Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 117 F.2d 615 (10th Cir.), cert,.
denied, 313 U.S. 564 (1941) (noteholders received cash and securities valued at $560,311 in excess
of their claims).
95. See H.R. REP., supra note 20, at 414, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEWS
at 6370.
96. One commentator on the Code has suggested that a dissenting class of creditors that is to
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a. Fair and equitable treatment of an impaired class of dissenting
secured claims
Section 1129(b)(2) of the Code97 enumerates certain minimum re-
quirements that must be met in order for a plan to be "fair and equita-
ble" with respect to a dissenting class. With respect to a dissenting class
of secured claims, section 1129(b)(2)(A) 98 requires that the proposed
distribution to such a dissenting class meet one of three tests in order
for the plan to be "fair and equitable" with respect to that class. Under
alternative (i) the holders of claims within the class must retain the lien
securing those claims to the extent of the allowed amount of their
claims, and must receive deferred cash payments that total at least the
allowed amount of the claims and whose value, as of the effective date
of the plan, equals the value of their interest in the collateral.
In the case of an adequately collateralized secured creditor, this
provision would require that the creditor receive deferred cash pay-
ments that total no less than the full amount of its allowed claim and
that have a present value equal to the full amount of its allowed claim,
secured by a lien for the full amount of its allowed claim. In the case of
an inadequately collateralized secured creditor, the result required by
alternative (i) will depend on whether the secured creditor has made
the section I lll(b) election to waive any right to an unsecured defi-
ciency, and to have the entirety of its claim treated as secured. Under
alternative (i) the dissenting secured creditor who has not made the
receive equity securities in satisfaction of a portion of its debt would be entitled only to securities
with a reorganization value equal to the amount of the cancelled debt and no more. See Klee,
supra note 40, at 149-50, 166. This conclusion appears questionable, however, in light of the
apparent intent to preserve the concept of the "step-up" reflected in the House Report.
97. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (West 1979).
98. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A) provides as follows:
(b)(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and
equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides-
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the lien securing such
claims, whether the property subject to such lien is retained by the debtor or trans-
ferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of
such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such
claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such
holder's interest in the estate's interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property
that is subject to the lien securing such claims, free and clear of such lien, with such
lien to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the treatment of such lien on pro-
ceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent
of such claims.
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section 111 (b) election must receive deferred cash payments having a
present value no less than the value of its interest in the collateral, se-
cured by a lien for not less than the value of its interest in the collateral.
For example, if a secured creditor holds a claim of $100,000, which is
secured by a first lien on collateral valued at only $60,000, and chooses
not to make the section I 1 l(b) election, that creditor's allowed secured
claim would be $60,000. Accordingly, the deferred cash payments
under the plan, the present value of those payments as of the effective
date of the plan, and the lien given to secure those payments, would all
have to equal at least $60,000. This congruity of numbers results be-
cause the allowed amount of the secured claim equals the value of the
secured creditor's interest in the collateral when the creditor has not
made the section 111 (b) election.99 As a practical matter, however, the
sum of the deferred cash payments under the plan would have to ex-
ceed the allowed amount of the secured claim (that is, the value of the
creditor's interest in the collateral); otherwise, the present discounted
value of the deferred cash payments would, of necessity, be less than
the allowed amount of the secured claim.
On the other hand, if the inadequately collateralized creditor
makes the section I 111 (b) election, that creditor will have an allowed
secured claim equal to the full amount of its allowed claim, regardless
of the value of the collateral, and will have no claim for an unsecured
deficiency. In this situation, compliance with alternative (i) would re-
quire that the plan provide for the payment to the secured creditor of
deferred cash payments equal to no less than the total amount of its
allowed claim (rather than payments equal to no less than the value of
the creditor's interest in the collateral), whose present value as of the
effective date of the plan is not less than the value of the creditor's
interest in the collateral, secured by a lien for not less than the full
amount of the creditor's allowed claim. Using the example of the cred-
itor owed $100,000 who holds collateral valued at $60,000, the effect of
the section 1111 (b) election would be that in order to meet alternative
(i) for satisfying the "fair and equitable" requirement, the plan would
have to provide for the payment to the secured creditor of deferred
cash payments totalling $100,000, with a present discounted value as of
the effective date of the plan of $60,000, secured by a lien for $100,000.
Thus, by making the section 1111(b) election the dissenting secured
creditor will have increased the minimum deferred cash payment re-
quired to permit a cram-down under alternative (i) from a sum equal to
99. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
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the value of the creditor's interest in the collateral to a sum equal to the
full amount of the secured creditor's claim. In addition, the dissenting
secured creditor will be entitled to have that payment secured by a lien
for the full amount of the secured creditor's claim, as opposed to a lien
for only the value of the creditor's interest in the collateral. The pres-
ent value, however, of the deferred cash payments required to comply
with alternative (i) will be equal to the value of the creditor's interest in
the collateral, regardless of whether or not the section 111 (b) election
is made. Accordingly, the plan proponent can cope with the dissenting
secured creditor who has made the section 111 (b) election by stretch-
ing the deferred payments out over a greater period of time. Thus, the
practical economic benefit of the section 111 (b) election to the secured
creditor faced with alternative (i) is that the effect of the election will be
to require that the lien securing the deferred cash payments equal the
full amount of the creditor's claim, rather than only the value of the
creditor's interest in the collateral.
Under alternative (ii) a plan must provide for the sale of the se-
cured creditor's collateral free and clear of its lien, with the lien to at-
tach to the proceeds of the sale, and for the lien on the proceeds to be
treated in accordance with alternative (i) or (iii).t10
Finally, under alternative (iii) the plan must provide that the
holder of the secured claim realize the "indubitable equivalent" of that
claim. 10  The legislative history suggests that this requirement would
100. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2)(ii) (West 1979). One effect of such a sale is that the nonrecourse
secured creditor would be denied the option of having an allowable unsecured claim for the un-
secured deficiency that would otherwise be available under § Ill l(b)(l). See Id
§ 1 lII(b)(1)(A)(ii). A second effect of a sale free and clear of liens under § 363 would be to
preclude the inadequately secured recourse creditor from making the § I 1I I(b) election to have
the total amount of its claim treated as an allowed secured claim. See id. § Ill l(b)(l)(B)(ii).
Consequently, compliance with alternative (i) for making a plan "fair and equitable" as to a
dissenting class of recourse secured creditors could be had by providing for deferred cash pay-
ments that aggregate at least the value of the collateral, secured by a lien equal to the value of the
collateral, instead of by deferred cash payments aggregating the full amount of the secured credi-
tor's allowed claim, secured by a lien for the full amount of that claim.
It is less clear whether a nonrecourse creditor whose collateral is sold is precluded from mak-
ing the § I I 11(Ib) election. Section 111 l(b)(1)(B)(i) precludes a class of recourse secured claims
from making the § 111 l(b) election when the property is to be sold under the plan. It does not, by
its terms, preclude a class of nonrecourse secured claims whose collateral has been sold from
making the election. Under § 111 l(b)(1)(A)(ii), however, the nonrecourse creditor whose collat-
eral has been sold will not be treated as a recourse creditor. It makes no sense to speak of a
creditor's "electing" treatment as a nonrecourse creditor if the creditor has no choice. Moreover,
the legislative history suggests that the secured creditor whose collateral is sold should be excluded
from treatment under § 1111(b). See SENATE RcoiD, supra note 22, at S17,420.
101. The standard of "indubitable equivalence" appears to be taken from the reference to
"indubitable equivalence" in In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935). See Housn
REcoRD, supra note 22, at HI 1,104; SENATE REcoRD, supra note 22, at S17,421. In Murel Hold-
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be satisfied by abandoning the collateral to the secured creditor or by
giving the creditor a lien on similar collateral." 2 Accordingly, this re-
quirement could be met by a plan providing for the sale of the secured
creditor's collateral free and clear of liens, with the secured creditor's
lien to be transferred from the proceeds of the sale to some other collat-
eral with a value equivalent to that which was sold. Thus, the proceeds
of property that was subject to a lien might be freed for use by the
reorganized debtor. On the other hand, Congress apparently thought
that unsecured notes or equity securities in the reorganized debtor
would not be the "indubitable equivalent" of a secured claim. 0 3
b. Fair and equitable treatment of an impaired class of dissenting
unsecured claims
Section 1129(b)(2)(B) provides for two tests, one of which must be
met by a plan in order to make it fair and equitable with respect to a
dissenting class of impaired unsecured claims."° Under alternative (i)
the plan must provide that each holder of a claim in the class is to
receive or retain on account of the claim, "property of a value, as of the
effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such
claim."10 The reference to "property" in the context of the required
distribution to a dissenting class of unsecured claims contrasts with the
reference to "cash" in section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) relating to secured
claims and includes both tangible and intangible property, such as eq-
ing, the court held that the payment of the principal amount of a debt over time and without any
interest was not completely compensatory to the secured creditor because payment over time is
not generally the equivalent of payment now. The court stated that a creditor should not be
deprived of his money or his security, "unless by a substitute of the most indubitable equiva-
lence." 75 F.2d at 942.
102. See HOUSE RECORD, supra note 22, at Hll,104; SENATE RECORD, supra note 22, at
S17,421.
103. See id.
104. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (West 1979) provides:
(b)(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and
equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims-
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive
or retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the
plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of
such class will not receive or retain on account of such junior claim or interest any
property.
105. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i).
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uity securities of the debtor. " Thus, unlike a dissenting class of se-
cured claims, a dissenting class of unsecured claims may be compelled
to accept equity securities of the reorganized debtor.
Under alternative (ii) the plan must provide that the holder of any
claim or interest that is junior to the claim of the dissenting class will
not receive or retain any property on account of its claim or interest.1 7
Thus, no class junior to the dissenting class may participate in the plan
unless the dissenting class is compensated to the full extent of its al-
lowed claim.
c. Fair and equitable treatment of an impaired class of dissenting
interests
Section 1129(a)(2)(C) provides for two tests, one of which must be
met in order to make a plan fair and equitable with respect to a dissent-
ing class of impaired interests. 10 8 These alternatives generally track
those applicable to a dissenting class of impaired unsecured claims. Al-
ternative (i) requires that each holder of an interest in the class must
receive or retain on account of the interest property with a value, as of
the effective date of the plan, equal to the greatest of the allowed
amount of any fixed liquidation preference to which the holder is enti-
tled, any fixed redemption price to which the holder is entitled, and the
value of the holder's interest.'0 9 Under alternative (ii), and as in the
case of a class of unsecured claims, the plan must provide that the
holder of any interest junior to the dissenting class will not receive or
retain under the plan any property on account of the junior interest.1 0
106. See H.R. REP., supra note 20, at 413, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 6369; HousE RECORD, supra note 22, at HI 1,104; SENATE REcoRD, supra note 22, at S17,421.
107. II U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West 1979).
108. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(C) provides as follows:
(b)(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and
equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(C) With respect to a class of interests-
(i) the plan provides that each holder of an interest of such class
receive or retain on account of such claim (sic) property of a value, as of the effec-
tive date of the plan, equal to the greatest of the allowed amount of any fixed liqui-
dation preference to which such holder is entitled, any fixed redemption price to
which such holder is entitled, and the value of such interest; or
(ii) the holder of any interest that is junior to the interests of such
class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior interest any
property.
109. Id. § 1129(a)(2)(C)(i).
110. Id. § 1129(a)(2)(C)(ii).
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V. VALUATION UNDER CHAPTER 11
The foregoing analysis of the "best interests" and "fair and equita-
ble" tests makes it clear that a valuation of some sort will be necessary
both to test the sufficiency of the proposed distribution to a dissenting
claim holder within a class that has accepted the plan, and to test the
sufficiency of the proposed distribution to a dissenting class. The re-
quired valuation may include both a valuation of a secured creditor's
interest in the collateral and a valuation of the proposed distribution to
a class (other than immediate cash payment).
The value ascribed to an asset ultimately depends on the assump-
tions made regarding its use or disposition. For example, if one as-
sumes that the property must be sold on a forced liquidation, the
resulting valuation of the asset (often referred to as "liquidation
value") may be less than would be the case if one assumes that the
property is to be sold at arms' length between a willing buyer and
seller, neither being required to sell or buy (often referred to as "fair
market value"'). Similarly, the method of valuation used to value a
business enterprise will depend on whether one assumes a liquidation
of assets on a piecemeal basis or its operation as a going concern. In
the latter case, the test of value is "going concern value" based on a
capitalization of future earnings of the business." 2 Thus, any contest
over the appropriate method of valuation to be adopted in any given
context will necessarily focus on the assumed use or disposition of the
asset that underlies the valuation.
The draftsmen of the Code apparently took to heart the Supreme
Court's admonition that "value is a word of many meanings, [which]
gathers its meaning in a particular situation from the purpose for which
a valuation is being made,"1 3 because the Code does not prescribe the
method or methods of valuation to be used. Instead, section 506(a)" 4
provides that the value of a secured creditor's collateral "shall be deter-
mined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed dis-
position or use of such property. . . ." The legislative history indicates
that "value" may be liquidation value, going concern value, or some-
thing in between, based on "the facts of each case and the competing
111. See In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 3 B.C.D. 301,308 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (Bankruptcy Judge).
In fact, each of the two values described in the text is a liquidation value, because both assump-
tions envision liquidation of the asset.
112. See generally text accompanying notes 55-65 supra.
113. Group of Inst'l Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943).
114. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 1979).
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interests in the case."' 15
In light of the different purposes of the "best interests" test embod-
ied in section 1129(a)(7) and the "fair and equitable" test contained in
section 1129(b), the method used to value the same asset, and what it is
that is being valued, is likely to differ, depending on the test applied.
The purpose of the "best interests" standard is to ensure that each dis-
senting holder of a claim or interest fares at least as well under the plan
as he would have in a straight bankruptcy liquidation under Chapter
7. 116 Accordingly, the focus of the valuation made for purposes of ap-
plying this test will be on what could be realized on the sale of each
asset of the business in a liquidation conducted under the auspices of
the bankruptcy court.
On the other hand, the proper focus of the valuation made for
purposes of applying the "fair and equitable" standard is that of deter-
mining the "going concern" value of the business as a whole, with the
assumption that the value of the whole will differ from the sum of the
individual parts. The requirements of section 1129(a)(7) already deal
with the problem of assuring each dissenting class that it will receive at
least as much under the plan as it would receive upon a liquidation.
The application of section 1129(b) presupposes that this first hurdle has
been overcome; the issue then becomes one of the proper allocation of
the "going concern" value of the debtor among the various classes of
claims and interests.
These differences in the appropriate valuation methods arise out of
the different judgments reflected in sections 1129(a)(7) and 1129(b).
The formulation of the standard of economic protection to be applied
to a dissenting claim holder, equity holder, or class requires an answer
to the question whether dissenters are entitled to be compensated for
their claims or interests on the basis of liquidation value or going con-
cern value. This question may be framed in terms of who is entitled to
receive the "going concern bonus"' 1 7 of a reorganized debtor-credi-
tors or stockholders. Section 1129(a)(7) reflects a judgment that if the
requisite majority of a class is willing to accept a plan that does not
115. H.R. REP., supra note 20, at 356, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at6312. See also id at 224, reprinted in [1978] U.s. CODE CONa. & AD. NEws at 6183.
116. See generally H.R. REP., supra note 20, at 412, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 6368; HOU~sE RECORD, spra note 22, at HI 1,103; SENATE RECORD, supra note 22, at
S17,420.
117. The term "going concern bonus" has been used to describe the amount by which the
going concern value of income-producing assets exceeds their liquidation value. See In re
Jumpers Equities, Ltd., 4 B.C.D. 1269, 1270 (D. Md. 1978).
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compensate the class in full, but that nevertheless permits junior classes
to receive part of the going concern bonus, that decision will be binding
on the majority. Accordingly, it is not anticipated that the court will be
required to determine the going concern value of the business as a
whole when the requisite majority of each class has accepted the
plan,"18 because the dissenting majority of an accepting class must be
guaranteed only that it will fare as well as it would in a liquidation and
is not considered to be entitled to any portion of the going concern
bonus. On the other hand, the fair and equitable test embodied in sec-
tion 1129(b) represents a judgment that a senior dissenting class must
share in the debtor's going concern value to the full extent of its claims
or interests before any junior class can share in that value." 9 A going
concern valuation therefore becomes necessary in the context of apply-
ing the fair and equitable test.
A. Valuation for Purposes of Section 1129(a)(7)
The application of the "best interests of creditors" standard em-
bodied in section 1129(a)(7) may require valuation from three different
perspectives. First, section 1129(a)(7)(A) requires that each dissenting
holder of a claim or interest within a given class receive property of a
value not less than the amount that the holder would receive if the
debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7.12o Hence, it will be necessary
to determine the distribution that would probably be received by the
dissenters in the event of a Chapter 7 liquidation in order to ascertain
whether the plan should be confirmed. This determination will necessi-
tate, among other things, an appraisal of the anticipated realization
upon a liquidation of the debtor's assets in a straight bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. 12 ' This anticipated realization would ordinarily be deter-
mined on a "forced sale" basis because of factors such as the cost of
storage and the risk of deterioration that are likely to compel expedi-
tious disposition in. the event of bankruptcy. When there is a strong
118. See H.R. Rp., supra note 20, at 414, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 6370 ("While Section 1129(a) does not contemplate a valuation of the debtor's business, such a
valuation will almost always be required under § 1129(b).").
119. See text accompanying notes 66 & 67 supra.
120. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (West 1979); see id § 701-766.
121. The determination of the distribution that would be made in a Chapter 7 liquidation
would require not only a liquidation value appraisal of the debtor's assets but also an evaluation
of any causes of action for the recovery of fraudulent conveyances, preferences, or the like that a
trustee in a Chapter 7 liquidation might have, and an evaluation of what assets would be left for
distribution after paying administrative and priority claims. See H.R. REP., supra note 20, at 412,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6368.
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possibility, however, that the trustee would have a practicable alterna-
tive to the "forced sale" approach, that possibility should militate in
favor of a valuation somewhat greater than a "forced sale" appraisal.' 22
In determining the likely distribution in a liquidation the probable
delay in distribution to creditors should be taken into account. Nor-
mally, in a Chapter 7 liquidation, the assets would have ;o be liqui-
dated and the administration of the estate completed before any
distribution could be made. Accordingly, in order to estimate the pres-
ent value of the likely distribution in the event of a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion, the court must estimate the number of years it would take to
administer the estate under Chapter 7 and determine the present value
of the anticipated future distribution.
Second, once the court determines the probable distribution that
would be made to the dissenters in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquida-
tion, it must ascertain the "present value" of the property that they are
to receive under the plan of reorganization in order to compare the
present value of the two potential distributions. If the property to be
distributed under the plan consists of an immediate cash payment on
the effective date of the plan, the value of the property to be distributed
is simply the amount of the cash.
If the property consists of deferred cash payments, those payments
must be discounted to their present value. 23 The higher the discount
rate chosen, the lower will be the present value of the deferred cash
payments. In order to assure that each dissenting creditor fares at least
as well as it would on a liquidation, the discount rate used to calculate
present value should be based on a market rate of interest because the
dissenting creditor could presumably take the cash that would be re-
ceived on a liquidation and invest it at a market rate of interest. If any
interest rate lower than a market rate of interest were used as the basis
for discounting, the creditor would end up with deferred cash payments
under the plan of reorganization that total less than those that would
have been received had the creditor received its share of the distribu-
tion on a liquidation and reinvested it at a market rate of interest.
Determining a "market rate of interest" may not be an easy task,
especially when the deferred cash payments will be made on a long-
term basis. In such a case, the court would presumably have to predict
122. See generally In re American Kitchen Foods, Inc., 2 B.C.D. 715, 719-22 (D. Me. 1976)
(Bankruptcy Judge).
123. See generally H.R. REP., supra note 20, at 414-15, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 6370.
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the market rate of interest for each of the years in which the deferred
cash payments will be made in order to discount each cash payment to
a present value. Given the recent experience of the American econ-
omy, any predictions about future interest rates could justifiably be
viewed with skepticism. As a practical matter, courts should attempt to
determine the market rate of interest by looking at the interest rates
being charged with respect to obligations of comparable maturities in
the debtor's locality. Focusing on the debtor's locality will enable the
courts to take into account local peculiarities that might affect the mar-
ket rate of interest, such as usury laws. Because interest rates typically
include a risk factor, however, courts will have to attempt to find the
rate being charged on an obligation of comparable maturity to a bor-
rower of comparable creditworthiness. It may be difficult to find com-
parable loans involving debtors who have just emerged from the depths
of a Chapter 11 case.
The trickiest problems of valuation with respect to testing the pro-
posed distribution under section 1129(a)(7) are likely to be encountered
when the property to be distributed under the plan consists of equity
securities of the reorganized debtor. Theoretically, the ideal measure
of value for this stock would be the fair market value of the stock fol-
lowing its distribution under the plan. If the market value of the secur-
ities to be received by a dissenter under the reorganization plan at least
equalled the distribution that the dissenter would receive on a liquida-
tion, there would be adequate assurance that the dissenter would do as
well in reorganization as he or she would have done on a liquidation
simply by selling the securities received under the plan.
The use of market value in such a situation is problematic, to say
the least. There may be no active market in the debtor's securities from
which a market value could be ascertained; indeed, the debtor might
not have issued any securities prior to the Chapter I 1 filing.'24 Even if
the debtor had previously issued stock in which there had been active
trading, the prices for which the debtor's stock previously sold may not
be a very reliable index of the value of the stock that will be issued
under the plan, because the market value of that stock may be affected
by the dilution resulting from the issuance of additional shares and the
alteration of the debtor's debt and equity structure required by the
plan. Nevertheless, if the court can be satisfied as to the likely market
value of the new securities by expert testimony that takes these factors




into account, that value should be used because it enables the court to
determine whether a dissenting creditor can fare as well in the reorgan-
ization as it would upon a liquidation by selling the new stock.
In cases in which a fair market valuation of the securities to be
issued under the plan is impractical, the only method of valuation that
would appear to be consistent with the liquidation orientation of the
"best interests" test would be to determine the liquidation value of the
debtor's assets, subtract from that value the indebtedness with which
the reorganized debtor will emerge, and treat the difference as the liqui-
dation value of the equity securities of the reorganized debtor. The
value assigned to the stock distributed to a particular claimant would
be his pro rata share of that equity.
It might be argued that, for purposes of applying section
1129(a)(7), the value of the equity securities to be distributed under the
plan should be determined by valuing the debtor's business on a going
concern basis. The legislative history would seem to preclude this re-
sult because it states that section 1129(a)(7) does not contemplate a val-
uation of the debtor's business. 125  Moreover, it is arguably
inappropriate to compare the distribution a creditor would receive on a
liquidation with the "going concern value" of tle stock that it is to
receive under the plan because that going concern value may not be
reflected in the amount the creditor would realize if it attempted to sell
that stock in the near future.1 26 A creditor is not receiving as much as it
would in a liquidation when it receives stock that it cannot expect to
sell in the reasonably foreseeable future for an amount equal to what it
would receive in a distribution upon a liquidation.
On the other hand, a distribution in a Chapter 7 liquidation would
not take place immediately. It might take years to wind up the estate
and make a distribution. If the court is convinced that the fair market
value of the securities will approach going concern value within the
time that it would take to make a distribution in a bankruptcy liquida-
tion, it may be appropriate to look to the going concern value of the
securities, even in the context of applying the "best interests" test.
Whether such an approach is applied will, of course, depend on
whether the court is convinced that the "intrinsic value" of the securi-
ties will be reflected in their market value at the time that the hypothet-
ical Chapter 7 distribution would take.place.
125. See H.R. REP., supra note 20, at 414, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEWS
6370.
126. See generally text accompanying notes 20, 21, & 74 supra.
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Finally, for purposes of the "best interests" test, it may be neces-
sary to value a dissenting secured creditor's collateral for purposes of
determining what that creditor would receive in the case of a Chapter 7
liquidation, or, in the case of a claim that is part of a class that has
made the section 1111(b) election, for purposes of determining the
value of the creditor's interest in the collateral. As a practical matter,
the issue of valuing the secured creditor's collateral becomes important
only when. one of the proposed valuation methods would produce a
value less than the amount of the creditor's claim. Because the thrust
of section 1129(a)(7) is to protect the dissenter from receiving less than
it would receive on a liquidation, liquidation value would seem to be
the logical method of valuing the collateral in this context.
Whether this liquidation value would be based on a forced liqui-
dation value or fair market value would depend on the disposition that
the secured creditor could be expected to make of the collateral-that
is, whether it would dispose of the collateral quickly or hold on to it in
an attempt to get a better price. The court might also take into account
the requirement of the Uniform Commercial Code that a disposition of
collateral be "commercially reasonable."'' 27 Finally, the court should
consider and deduct the costs that would be incurred in maintaining
and selling the collateral because the amount that the secured creditor
would net on a sale would be reduced by that amount.
The secured creditor who is collateralized by an income-producing
asset might contend that, in the event of a Chapter 7 liquidation, it
would purchase the asset at a sale by bidding in the full amount of its
claim as permitted by section 363(k), operate the asset, and thereby at-
tempt to realize the going concern value of the asset for itself. If the
court in such a case is convinced of the genuineness of the creditor's
representation that it would own and operate the asset, then the re-
quirement of providing the secured creditor with property of a value
equivalent to what it would get in a liquidation might be deemed to
require that its collateral be valued on a going concern basis.
B. Valuation/or Purposes of Applying the Fair and Equitable Test
Valuation for purposes of applying the "fair and equitable" test
may come into play in two contexts. First, in order to determine
whether the proposed distribution to the holder of a secured claim can
127. See In re American Kitchen Foods, Inc., 2 B.C.D. 715,720-22 (D. Me. 1976) (Bankruptcy
Judge).
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pass muster under section 1129(b)(2)(A), it will be necessary to deter-
mine the value of the secured creditor's interest in the collateral, 28
Second, it will be necessary to determine the present value of the
property to be received by each dissenting class under the plan. In the
case of a dissenting class of secured creditors, it will be necessary to
determine the present value of the deferred cash payments to be made
under the plan. 129 If there is a dissenting class of unsecured claims or
interests, and some junior class is permitted to participate in the plan, it
will be necessary to determine the value of the property given to the
dissenting class, in order to determine whether it is receiving property
of a value equal to the allowed amount of its claims or interests.
1 30
With respect to the valuation of collateral, the method chosen to
value a secured creditor's collateral will have a practical impact only if
one or more of the alternative methods of valuation would produce a
value less than the amount of the secured creditor's claim. If the value
of the creditor's interest in the collateral is less than the full amount of
its claim, the required present value of a fair and equitable distribution
to the secured creditor under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) would be corre-
spondingly less than the full amount of its claim.11 The effect of using
a valuation method that results in a higher value will be to require
deferred cash payments of a correspondingly higher present value, up
to a maximum of the full amount of the claim, to make the plan fair
and equitable to the dissenting secured creditor. 132
In the case of income-producing collateral, the battle between the
proponent of the plan and the dissenting secured creditor will probably
focus on whether forced liquidation value or going concern value is the
appropriate measure of the value of the collateral. 33 The philosophi-
cal question implicit in the battle over valuation methods in this situa-
tion is whether the secured creditor is entitled to a portion of the going
concern bonus inherent in its collateral.
There are a number of factors that may point to the use of going
128. See text accompanying notes 97-99 supra. Technically, the "fair and equitable test"
would be applied to a dissenting class of secured claims. The discussion in the text is framed in
terms of a secured creditor, rather than a secured class, in order to simplify the discussion. As a
practical matter, each secured creditor is likely to be in a class by itself. See text accompanying
note 23 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 98 & 99 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 106 & 107 supra.
131. See generally text accompanying notes 88-91 supra.
132. See text accompanying notes 97-99 supra.
133. See In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 3 B.C.D. 301 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
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concern value as the basis for valuing income-producing collateral
when applying the "fair and equitable" test. First, the inappropriate-
ness of using liquidation value is suggested by the fact that, in order to
satisfy the requirements of section 1129(a)(7), the plan will have had to
provide for the secured creditor to receive property of a present value
equal to that which the creditor would have received on a liquidation.
The "fair and equitable" test would appear to add little to section
1129(a)(7) if the collateral were valued on the basis of liquidation value
when applying the "fair and equitable" test. 134
Second, as previously indicated, one of the philosophical under-
pinnings of the "fair and equitable" test was the judgment that junior
classes should not participate in going concern value when senior
classes are not being paid in full. 135 It would appear to be inconsistent
with this judgment to limit the inadequately collateralized secured
creditor to a distribution based on the liquidation value of the collat-
eral, with the result that junior classes would be permitted to share in
the going concern value of the collateral, even though the secured cred-
itor was not receiving the full amount of its claim.
Finally, there is authority under the old Bankruptcy Act that sug-
gests that, when the debtor is attempting to "cram down" a secured
creditor whose collateral consists of an income-producing asset by pay-
ing the creditor the value of its interest in the collateral, the collateral
should be valued on a "going concern" basis. The issue of the proper
method of valuing the collateral of a crammed-down secured creditor
appears to have arisen most often in the context of the cram down pro-
visions of Chapter XII of the old Bankruptcy Act,' 36 dealing with real
property arrangements. 37  In a number of those cases, the courts
134. It should be noted that, even if a liquidation value approach to valuing the collateral
were used in the context of applying the "fair and equitable" test, the latter would still require a
greater degree of protection for the secured creditor than the "best interests" test. In the first
place, the "best interests" test can be satisfied by a plan giving the secured creditor "property"
other than cash, e.g., securities. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (West 1979). Thelegislative
history makes it clear that Congress, in using the word "property" instead of "cash" to describe
the consideration that could be paid to a creditor, intended to encompass the distribution of equity
securities in the debtor to the creditor. See H.R. REP., supra note 20, at 413, reprinted in [1978]
U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws at 6369. In addition, compliance with alternative (i) of the "fair
and equitable" test with respect to secured claims would require that the secured creditor retain
his lien on the property. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (West 1979). No similar requirement
is contained in id § 1129(a)(7)(A).
135. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
136. 11 U.S.C. §§ 801 to 926 (1976) (repealed 1978).
137. Bankruptcy Act § 461(11), 11 U.S.C. § 861(11) (1976) (repealed 1978), required that a
plan of arrangement under Chapter XII:
provide for any class of creditors which is affected by and does not accept the arrange-
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adopted the capitalization of prospective earnings approach to valuing
income-producing collateral.13 The justification for requiring this ap-
proach was that the entire theory of a reorganization proceeding is that
a reorganization of a going business is taking place. As one court col-
orfully phrased it:
Having declared itself a fish to be reorganized, it would be inconsis-
tent for the court now to permit the Debtor to declare itself a fowl to
be liquidated for purposes of "cramming down" a lower "appraised"
value upon the secured Creditors. Therefore, a liquidation value,
i.e., foreclosure value, is a procedure totally foreign to this matter
and not a proper standard for valuation.' 39
On the other hand, there is some authority under the old Bank-
ruptcy Act suggesting that the dissenting secured creditor collateralized
by an income-producing asset need not receive the full going concern
value inherent in that asset. In In re Jumpers Equities, Ltd " the court
indicated that the constitutionally required minimum valuation of a se-
cured creditor's collateral in a reorganization proceeding for purposes
of a cram down would be the present value of the net liquidation value
of the collateral as of the date the proceeding was filed. In other words,
the valuation of the collateral should allow the secured creditor to re-
ceive at least what it would have received had it, at the time the pro-
ceeding commenced, been permitted to foreclose on its security interest,
sell its collateral for cash, and earn interest on the cash. The court went
on to indicate that the entire going concern value need not be allocated
to the secured creditor, and stated that the "going concern bonus" must
be allocated on the basis of an "equitable apportionment" among all
the parties. 14 1 The court did not elaborate on the considerations that
should govern this "equitable apportionment."
There is some support in the legislative history for following this
ment by the two-thirds majority in amount required under this chapter, adequate protec-
tion for the realization by them of the value of their debts against the property dealt with
by the arrangement and affected by such debts, either, as provided in the arrangement or
in the order confirming the arrangement, (a) by the transfer or sale, or by the retention
by the debtor, of such property subject to such debts; or (b) by a sale of such property
free of such debts, at not less than a fair upset price, and the transfer of such debts to the
proceeds of such sale; or (c) by appraisal and payment in cash of the value of such debts;
or (d) by such method as will, under and consistent with the circumstances of the partic-
ular case, equitably and fairly provide such protection;. ..
138. See In re Pembroke Manor Apts., 547 F.2d 805, 807-08 (4th Cir. 1977); In re Georgetown
Apts., 3 B.C.D. 512, 514 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
139. In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 3 B.C.D. 301, 309 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (Bankruptcy Judge).
140. 4 B.C.D. 1269 (D. Md. 1978).
141. Id. at 1270.
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approach under the Code.'42 The obvious question then becomes that
of identifying those "equitable considerations" that might justify an ap-
portionment of the going concern value of the collateral among various
parties in interest.
One consideration is suggested by the cases that required that the
crammed-down secured creditor receive the full benefit of the going
concern value of the collateral. Those cases may have been predicated
on the belief that the creditor has been deprived of the chance to fore-
close on the collateral, acquire it at foreclosure by bidding in the debt,
and appropriate the going concern value for itself.143 If the creditor
would not have operated the asset but would instead have sold it, the
equities may not require that the creditor receive the full going concern
value, but only the amount that it could have expected to receive had it
been permitted to sell the property in the manner in which it was likely
to sell it when the case was filed, plus any interest that it could have
earned on the proceeds. Alternatively, a court dealing with a secured
creditor who would not have kept and operated an income-producing
asset might find it equitable to use a valuation that would give the se-
cured creditor something more than it would have received had it been
able to dispose of the property, while permitting the debtor to keep
some of the "going concern bonus," on the theory that the secured
creditor would not have obtained any portion of the bonus had the
debtor not been willing to retain and continue operating the property.
Disputes as to valuation may arise even when the collateral is not,
of itself, income-producing, but may have greater value as part of a
going concern rather than on a liquidation. Assets such as inventory
and accounts receivable can be converted into cash in the course of
business of a going concern at prices substantially above those avail-
able on a liquidation in bankruptcy.'44 The secured creditor collateral-
ized by such assets may contend that accounts of a going concern
should be valued at face value, subject to an appropriate bad debt re-
serve, and that inventory should be valued at the price that would be
obtained from customers in the ordinary course of business. This ap-
proach is more consistent with the debtor's operation as a going con-
cern than is an approach based on liquidation values. 145 As a matter of
142. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
143. See In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 3 B.C.D. 301, 303 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
144. See In re American Kitchen Foods, Inc., 2 B.C.D. 715, 721 (D. Me. 1976) (Bankruptcy
Judge).
145. See generally id.
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fairness, however, the value of the inventory ought to be reduced by the
cost of selling it, and the value of the accounts should be reduced not
only by a bad debt reserve, but also by the cost of collecting them. In
addition, it might be argued that because the value of the inventory and
accounts would be drastically reduced if the debtor ceased operation,
the difference between forced sale value and going concern value
should be allocated in some fair manner between the secured creditor
and other parties in interest. Although this approach might have been
precluded under the strict rule of absolute priority applied under Chap-
ter X of the old Bankruptcy Act, the concept of valuation under the
Code, as explained in the legislative history, may be broad enough to
permit such a result. 146
Similar disputes may arise with respect to the valuation of non-
income-producing collateral such as machinery, which, unlike inven-
tory and accounts, may not be sold or realized upon in the near future
as part of the debtor's business operations. With respect to such collat-
eral, the battle will probably focus on forced liquidation value versus a
"fair market" value. The use of a value greater than forced liquidation
value seems appropriate because if forced liquidation value were used
to determine whether a plan is fair and equitable to a secured creditor,
the fair and equitable test would add little to the best interests test.
Moreover, the "fair and equitable" test has traditionally been based on
the notion that limiting senior classes to liquidation values in a case in
which junior classes are to participate in the plan is unfair.
On the other hand, even if this collateral were sold for "fair mar-
ket" value by an ongoing business under no compulsion to sell, certain
costs would presumably have to be incurred to sell the property. As a
practical matter, then, fair market value would represent only a gross
price, and not net realizable value. Therefore, the fairest method of
valuation would appear to be one that seeks to determine nel fair mar-
ket value, considering the costs that would have to be incurred if the
asset was sold by an ongoing business in a manner designed to maxi-
mize the amount realized. 147
146. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
147. The use of different methods of valuation in applying the "best interests" and "fair and
equitable" tests may create confusion regarding the appropriate method of valuation for purposes
of determining the unsecured deficiency of a secured creditor who does not make the § I 11 l(b)
election. When the secured creditor's dissent to the plan requires that the "fair and equitable" test
be applied to the proposed distribution to the creditor, and the secured creditor's collateral is,
therefore, valued on a going concern basis, the method of valuation of the collateral used for
purposes of calculating the unsecured deficiency should coincide with that used to determine the
required distribution on account of the secured claim. If liquidation value were instead used for
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The second context in which valuation becomes important in ap-
plying the "fair and equitable" test is that of determining the present
value of the property to be received by the dissenting class. When the
property consists of deferred cash payments, the present value of those
deferred cash payments is to be determined by discounting the future
payments on the basis of a discount rate that reflects a market rate of
interest. 1
48
When the property to be distributed under the plan consists of eq-
uity securities in the reorganized debtor, those securities should be val-
ued on the basis of the going concern value of the debtor, as was the
case in the context of applying the fair and equitable requirement
under old Chapter X.149 The going concern value of the business as a
whole should be determined; the indebtedness with which the reorga-
nized debtor will emerge under the plan should be deducted from that
going concern value; and the balance-the "going concern equity"-
should be allocated to the equity securities on a pro rata basis. Thus,
application of the "fair and equitable" test will probably require valua-
tion of the debtor's business as a whole on a going concern basis when-
ever the plan proposes to distribute equity securities to the dissenting
classes.
On the other hand, a different method of valuation may come into
play when the securities to be issued under the plan are to be issued,
not by the debtor, but by some other entity-for example, in exchange
for some or all of the debtor's assets. Cases decided under Chapter X
of the Bankruptcy Act suggest that when the debtor's assets consist of
securities that have a readily ascertainable market value, and that do
purposes of calculating the unsecured deficiency to which the secured creditor as to whom the fair
and equitable test must be met is entitled, the sum of the required present value of the deferred
cash payments under the plan and the unsecured deficiency would exceed 100% of the secured
creditor's claim in any case in which the going concern value of the collateral exceeded its liquida-
tion value.
148. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
149. See generally text accompanying note 68-73 supra.
The conclusion that the test of value for purposes of applying the fair and equitable test
under Chapter I I is the same as that under old Chapter X is suggested by comments in the legisla-
tive history indicating that the fair and equitable test as applied under old Chapter X continues to
apply to dissenting classes under Chapter 11. See H.R. REP. supra note 20, at 413, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6370; HousE RECORD, supra note 22, at HIl,104; SEN-
ATE RECORD, supra note 22, at S17,420. Congress was aware of the test applied under Chapter X
and did not suggest that a different standard would be used in applying the fair and equitable test
under Chapter 11. In fact, it was stated that the application of the rule would require "a full
valuation of the debtor as the absolute priority rule does under current law." Id. at 223-24, re-
printed in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6184. See also id at 414, reprinted in [19781
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6370.
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not represent a controlling interest, the appropriate method of valua-
tion would be based on the fair market value of those securities, rather
than on a determination of the "going concern" value of the issuer of
the securities.'1 0 This approach can be justified because the use of an
artificially constructed "going concern" value, based on a capitalization
of prospective earnings, is predicated on the inability to ascertain the
fair market value of the reorganized debtor's securities, coupled with a
concern that the immediate value of those securities will be artificially
depressed because the debtor has just emerged from a reorganization
proceeding.' 5' These concerns may be inapposite when the stock being
distributed is that of an entity whose stock is actively traded, and which
is not in a reorganization proceeding. The market value of this entity's
stock would not be distorted by the cloud of a bankruptcy proceeding
and should presumably reflect expectations of future earnings.
Nevertheless, the use of going concern value for purposes of valu-
ing the securities of the acquiring entity may be appropriate when the
assets of the debtor would comprise a substantial portion of the assets
of the acquiring company after the acquisition. In this case, the fair
market value of the acquiring company's stock prior to the acquisition
would not necessarily bear any relationship to its fair market value af-
ter the acquisition had been completed. Moreover, the fair market
value of the stock following the acquisition might be artificially de-
pressed because a major portion of the acquiring company's operations
would have just emerged from a reorganization proceeding. Hence, it
may be appropriate to value the securities of the acquiring company to
be distributed under the plan by calculating a going concern value for
the company as a whole, after taking the acquisition into account, and
allocating that value, less the prospective debt of the acquiring com-
pany, on a pro rata basis among all of its equity securities for purposes
of determining the value of the securities to be received under the plan
by any dissenting class of claims or interests. 52
150. See Central States Elec. Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879, 884 (4th Cir. 1950) (when
debtor is holding company, with assets consisting of marketable securities, none of which repre-
sents a controlling interest, and which are readily valued by reference to market quotations, the
proper method of valuing the stock is presently realizable value of securities on hand).
151. See text accompanying notes 65, 78-80 supra.
152. But see In re Northeastern Steel Corp., 38 S.E.C. 41 (1957) (plan contemplated that
shares of stock would be issued to proponent in exchange for shares of proponent's common stock;
S.E.C. valued stock of debtor being received by proponent on basis of "going concern value" of
debtor, but valued stock of proponent on basis of "its fair market value as represented by fairly
current market prices".). Seegeneral/yIn re New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 304 F. Supp. 793, 808-09
(D. Conn. 1969), modgfed, 399 U.S. 392 (1970).
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VI. CONCLUSION
When one or more classes refuse to accept a plan, two different
valuations will probably be necessary-one for applying the "best in-
terests" test embodied in section 1129(a)(7), and one for applying the
"fair and equitable" test embodied in section 1129(b). Consequently
the same property may have two radically different values assigned to it
at the same confirmation hearing. Although this result may seem bi-
zarre, it is perfectly consistent with the different concerns and purposeg
that animate the two tests.
Determining and applying the proper method of valuation to be
used in any given context may be extremely difficult and give rise to
protracted litigation. The resulting uncertainty over the value that will
be ascribed to assets or a business by the court should spur the parties
in interest to reach compromises that will avoid a battle over valuation.

